Introduction:
Since starting this journey, I’ve had the opportunity to explore the intricate phenomenon of Chinese “Urban Villages,” which function as epicenters of community, affordable housing, and defining neighborhood character. The goal of this post is to draw from my own observations and various academic literature to merely introduce their complexities. This isn’t meant to be encapsulating of all the social, political, and economic implications tied to these spaces, nor really discuss solutions or reform. As an outsider, I would need to obtain much more quantitative and qualitative data and research.
Background
Though the population of China surpassed the United States in the mid-1970’s, it wasn’t until the “open door policy” and other economic reforms of the early 1980s that China experienced exponential economic growth and subsequently rapid urbanisation. This period has been referred to as the “revival phase” (1979-1996) where Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from 1978-1992, began a series of economic reforms aimed to foster economic prosperity and pushing the modernization of the Chinese economy. A component of these reforms was the introduction of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) in 1979, which included the city of Shenzhen (Ruibo-Linna, 2013).
Urban Village
This rapid urbanization of Shenzhen, commonly referred to as the “Silicon Valley of China,” required the government convert rural land for more development. Through land requisitions, to “avoid costly and time-consuming programs requiring the compensation and relocation of indigenous villagers” (Hao, 2011), the city expanded. Urban Villages lost their ample farmland, and the villagers were required to seek other economic ventures.
Simultaneously, many rural Chinese decided to migrate to these urban spaces seeking economic opportunity, which created pressure for the market to increase its supply of affordable workforce housing. Many urban villagers were able to fill this demand by becoming landlords, and “in order to maximize income, indigenous villagers have built high-density housing” (Hao, 2011).
More specifically, “the creation and prevalence of Urban Villages as a migrant housing market occur[ed] in the presence of four conditions” (Hao, 2011):
- Indigenous residents of urban villagers had the legal right to cost-free land for their housing.
- The governance of the urban villages laid outside the urban administration system and urban planning development control regulations, which gave rise to loopholes in how the land could be developed.
- Limited government jurisdiction also resulted in a weak enforcement of room renting regulations.
- Without a local hukou, a controversial classification system, rural migrants were excluded from more prestigious amenities or desirable jobs. For example, urban residents received priority over migrants when it came to employment opportunities, and when migrant workers did find jobs, they tended to be positions with little potential for growth (Li, 2013).
What emerged from this was communities that were major hubs of social, economic, and political activity. Though they’ve been difficult to define, due to their divisive and complex nature, the book Urban Villages in the New China: Case of Shenzhen defines spaces by following:
“The definition of urban villages in Shenzhen or in China in general cannot be fitted neatly into written words, much like their existence cannot be neatly fitted into cities. Urban villages in Shenzhen are actually clumsy combinations of memories, senses, and experiences…The villages represent completely different concepts to different people living within or beyond the borders of the urban village. Some live in the villages out of necessity but would rather live elsewhere if they could afford it. Some rather enjoy their lives in the villages and would even miss them were they to leave for somewhere else. Some people are born in urban villages. As for those who live outside the villages, the concepts of urban villages tend to be much simpler” (Wang, 2016).
However defined, these spaces have acted as a source of affordable housing and community for low-income workers, but attached to the urban villagers is a negative connotation.
Additionally, “aside from the loose association between migrants and crime, the original villagers of the urban villages are also stigmatized and despised by many outside the village” (Wang, 2016).
Anecdotally, this appears to be a result of continued disinvestment by landowners and the government (though their power within these jurisdiction is hazy). Since these spaces have largely experienced urban decay, there’s been a push towards “slum upgrading,” which focuses on “ people obtain[ing] an improved, healthy and secure living environment without being displaced” (MIT, 2010). In the case of Shenzhen, displacement appears to have inadvertently occurred. Though, something that I would like to echo is the following quote:
“Slums and ghettos are largely in the eyes of the beholder. American scholar Herbert Gans, in his study of the urban villages of Boston, argued that ‘residential structures—and districts—should be defined as slums only if they have been proven to be physically, socially, or emotionally harmful to their residents or to the larger community” (Wang 2016).
Urban Renewal
In the United States, many urban renewal efforts have been criticized for their lack of equity and their disruption of communities. In Shenzhen this appears to be equally true, because there’s not a clear answer to what happens to low-income residents after redevelopment. I’ve heard from several people that they have the “chance to stay, if they want,” but I don’t really understand the details. I do know that tenants don’t really have rights or protections here, which leaves them extremely vulnerable.
Based on my research, I’ve noticed that China is taking the more neoliberal route, with “the urban renewal process can be state- or privately driven” (Wang, 2016); developers are more readily able to make large-scale investments into a project.
For urban villagers, these urban renewal projects present both danger and opportunity. Developers “often bring with them a one-time large sum to pay off the villagers to leave their land and buildings, which presents a once-in-a-lifetime financial opportunity for them” (Wang, 2016).
How the government benefits is by ensuring that development continues, and from what I’ve heard, regains regulatory control of these spaces.
Urban Village: Hubei
Throughout this narrative, I’ve mentioned four major stakeholders involved with these urban villages: villagers, tenants, developers, and the government. Focusing on my personal experiences, I would like to particularly reflect on the Urban Village of Hubei, which I visited late July.
Hubei, located in the Luohu District, has already begun the redevelopment process. Walking through the narrow streets, you could also see a decommissioned institutional building being converted for residential uses, exposed sewage, dilapidated roofs, and visibly deteriorated foundations.
Conversely, you could still see an active community, where there was a local market and heavily utilized streets. The area was robust was still robust with life. It was superficially unclear what made these individuals decided to remain, and I didn’t want to make my own assumptions considering the complexities associated with these spaces… instead I looked towards the internet for more insight.
What I discovered was the site has been rather controversial, with a local blog stating that “the demolitions have incited architects, urban planners, and public intellectuals to submit detailed counter proposals and cultural events to protect the area” (shenzhennoted.com, 2016). It appeared that the section surrounding the temple will be protected, but to what extent is still unclear. Personally, I found it perplexing that the decision was based on preservation (also important), and not the tenants who lived within the village. Being an outsider I find it hard to really insert my thoughts regarding the situation, but as the article titled The last days of Shenzhen’s great urban village states about perception towards urban renewal efforts in urban villages, Duan Peng, a local architect, stated
“During past urban village redevelopments, they’ve paid attention to the interests of the developer, of the government, of the original residents, but no one has ever paid attention to the interests of the renters,” Duan says. “And to some extent, these renters are the real owners of the urban villages. They have made huge contributions to Shenzhen and the urban villages, but if the government says raze, then the village is razed, and if the government says get out, then the people have to get out.”
References:
Has, P., Sliuzas, R., & Geertman, S. (2011). The development and redevelopment of urban villages in Shenzhen. Habitat International,35(2), 214-224. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0197397510000603.
Li, C. (2013). Institutional and non-institutional paths: Migrants and non-migrants’ different processes of socioeconomic status attainment in China. In China’s Internal and International Migration (pp. 29-39). New York, New York: Routledge
MacKinnon, E. (2016, September 29). The last days of Shenzhen’s great urban village. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/2023255/last-days-shenzhens-great-urban-village
O’Donnell, M. A. (2016, July 17). Shenzhen Noted. Retrieved July 31, 2019, from https://shenzhennoted.com/2016/07/17/hubei-shenzhen-identity-comes-of-age/#more-13768
WANG, D. W. (2017). Urban Villages in the New China: Case of shenzhen. S.l.: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wang, L., & Hann, R. (2013). Challenges and Opportunities Facing China’s Urban Development in the New Era. China Perspectives [Online],15-27. Retrieved from http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6149
What is Urban Upgrading. (MIT,n.d.). Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/whatis/what-is.html
Further Research:
Wu, W., & Wang, J. (2016). Gentrification effects of China’s urban village renewals. Urban Studies,54(1), 214-229. doi:10.1177/0042098016631905